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Abstract: Many analytically trained philosophers argue that for a movie to do
philosophy it must contain arguments, or develop thought experiments, or provide
counterexamples, otherwise whatever philosophy might seem to be in it is just the
viewer’s projection. Most of the analytic responses to what Tom Wartenburg calls
‘the imposition objection’ (IO), including his own, share an assumption I argue is
unfounded, namely, that the traditional philosophical text is the standard by which
we should judge the philosophical status of anything, including movies. I argue that
tethering movies’ philosophy bona fides to standard philosophical works actually
invites IO, absent a known philosophically minded creator behind the production.
Accepting the argument-centric written text as the standard also begs the question
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about the nature of philosophy, and discounts (or worse) the philosophical powers
of movies and other media; such a position also impoverishes the many and complex
ways philosophy deepens our understanding of the world, of others, and of ourselves.
I offer a liberating example in my account of Christopher Nolan’s Insomnia on its
own philosophical terms.
Readers will soon see that I take seriously the ‘without theory’ in the special
issue journal title.
Many philosophers outside the Anglo-American analytic tradition are
likely to find questions about whether movies can do philosophy puzzling;
they might start instead with questions about how a particular movie does
some particular philosophy. I will use the word ‘movies’ throughout because
what I argue applies to film or digital productions, (and indeed much of what
I have argued could also apply to some TV). Analytically trained philoso-
phers worry that when it comes to mainstream Hollywood movies at least
the viewer is the main or only source of whatever philosophy might be found
in them, a variation of what Thomas Wartenberg calls the Imposition Objec-
tion (IO) in his seminal 2007 book Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy.1
Thomas Wartenberg is the friend in question, and he is not alone. While I
do not think that Wartenberg is an enemy of the view that movies can screen
philosophy – on the contrary – I do think, and I will argue that, the way he
responds to IO concedes too much to the enemy in question, those who think
movies cannot and do not screen philosophy.
Wartenberg agrees with Imposition Objectors who specify that only creator-
oriented interpretations of a film can justify the claim that the film itself
is philosophical.2 And he tries to show that viewers can provide creator-
oriented interpretations of films without attributing philosophical knowledge
or intention directly to the filmmakers. Still, to avoid the philosophical dis-
enfranchisement of film someone has to have that philosophical knowledge to
attribute to its creators.
Wartenberg argues elegantly that, to take just a few examples from the
book, John Ford’s The Man Who Shot Liberty Valence presents its own ver-
sion of Nietzsche’s criticism of Hegel’s conception of history by examining one
small slice of history through a fictional story about the so-called Wild West.3
And that The Third Man supplements the Aristotelian notion of phronêsis
by showing the role that moral vicissitudes play in Holly Martins’ moral de-
velopment; that these and other films, in short, to use Wartenberg’s preferred
verb, screen philosophy.4 But to show that a movie can meet IO this way is
not to dispose of the objection; one even could say that responses like these
give life to the objection by implicitly accepting that one must justify the
view that movies can screen philosophy, rather than the other way around,
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and by giving accounts of the movies that in every case liberally draw on pro-
fessional philosophical knowledge few viewers have. Wartenberg consistently
tethers movies’ philosophical merits rather narrowly to well-known texts and
ideas, so much so that – I hate to say it – his own analyses thus often seem to
invite IO. Though he rejects the view that any of the movies’ makers knew
or had to have known about the sources, still, the implication is that the
way to establish that the philosophy is IN the movies, rather than projected
ON TO the movies by the trained viewer – us – is to identify known and
text-based philosophical arguments, concepts, figures, or lines of thought in
them. The implication is that if we cannot make a compelling link between
what is in the movie to what is in a canonical text then we must simply
be projecting the philosophical content, and the movie is not screening phi-
losophy. Wartenberg’s dilemma, in short, is that the most natural way to
show that a movie is genuinely philosophical is to talk about it in a way that
invites IO. First, he tacitly accepts the presumption that if we cannot iden-
tify a philosophical agent behind a work, intentionally doing philosophy, then
there is a problem with taking the work to be properly philosophical. What
Wartenberg offers as an alternative to positing a philosopher behind – or in
front of – the camera is the next best thing: a philosophically sophisticated
account of what is in the contested work that matches up with the philo-
sophical work we find in the great works of philosophy. But this method of
certifying movies’ philosophical bona fides ends up circling the wagons around
the traditional disciplinary boundaries of philosophy rather than expanding
our notions about how philosophy can be done, where it can be found, and
by whom.
Wartenberg’s interpretations are what you might call weakly creator-
oriented – they posit a meaning that the filmmaker(s) could have intended.5
But what is the force of that ‘could’? ‘. . . this does not entail that John Ford
actually had to have had Hegel or Nietzsche in mind. All that is necessary
is that he was thinking about the philosophical view that we can trace back
to these great philosophers and that it makes sense to think of him as at-
tempting to respond to one and defend another in the specific context of the
Hollywood western.’6
All that is necessary? This strikes me as going about the task of respond-
ing to IO exactly backwards. The ‘we’ refers to philosophers and students
of philosophy, so on Wartenberg’s view the philosophical character of a film
is likely to be understandable only by an audience of trained philosophers, a
troubling and surely false view. Second, and equally problematic, is Warten-
berg’s identification of philosophy with (the) great philosophers of the canon,
and a narrow conception of their methodology: it is okay if Ford did not have
Nietzsche or Nietzschean lines of argument in mind, as long as some viewer
did and can imagine that Ford might have. Put a crowd of smart, ordinary
people in the theater who are ignorant about the history of philosophy and
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they are unlikely to come up with readings of the film that can be traced to
the great philosophers or the great philosophical lines of argument.
Wartenberg’s analyses show that he accepts the terms of the objector. But
why concede the necessary condition that someone has to provide a creator-
oriented interpretation – if only by contingent attribution to the filmmaker(s)
– of a movie in order to certify it as philosophical? And why think that the
contingent attribution has to be linked to great philosophers or great works
of philosophy? At the very least to start with the even a conditional link to
the creators’ mental states begs many interesting question about the nature
of philosophy, what methodologies we might pursue and how and who might
engage in the practice.
I do not tie movies’ philosophical power to their ability to advance argu-
ments by familiar figures, rather to their capacity to show us, in often gripping
ways, things about the world, other people, and ourselves – and the many
metaphysical, ethical, and epistemological problems in our relations to them,
in complex and nuanced ways. The philosophical work in them need not be
original, or unique to the work or genre, two requirements we surely do not
impose on traditional philosophical work. It need not be argument driven. It
is sufficient that the reasonably thoughtful viewer can plausibly reconstruct a
compelling account of what the movie is doing philosophically. The evidence
is on the screen.7
I do not mean to suggest that the anxieties about the question of where
the philosophical themes come from are not legitimate. But it is a mistake to
try to answer those worries at the expense of what is distinctively interesting
and powerful about the way movies do what they do with ideas. And let us
also not just focus on movies that deliver arguments in neat packages tied
up in a bow. We should instead begin by asking what we want the practice
of philosophy to do for us. Catherine Elgin has argued powerfully that other
artistic genres such as fiction, models, paintings, and works of music can,
among other things, move us to appreciate multiple points of view, chronicle
moral development (including decline), signal shifting allegiances, effect re-
finements in sensory discrimination, activate dormant systems of categories,
provoke discovery, incite investigation, and aid self-knowledge by disclosing
unexamined assumptions.8 Surely movies can deliver amply these rich philo-
sophical goods.
I turn now hopefully to Christopher Nolan’s 2002 taut noir thriller Insom-
nia. How does it stack up philosophically? How I answer that question will
matter to my case, and whether my account can be philosophically adequate
without relying on philosophically mainstream figures or schools of thought.
I chose a popular movie by a well-known director (though most of Nolan’s
fame followed this, his second, feature, a remake of a 1997 Norwegian movie)
because I am also interested in exploring the role movies play in our wider
philosophical culture – philosophical work being done and consumed outside
the academy.
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It is a murder mystery, so it is hardly original to say that it depicts a search
for knowledge – whodunit? – including stumbling blocks and twists and turns
and a fair amount of blood along the way. But in a sharp Nolan move, before
long two other deaths become part of the primary murder mystery, and several
related quests for knowledge, are superimposed on the main one unfolding.
The movie opens with a thrilling, genuinely awesome, tracking shot from
a helicopter flying over some jagged snowy mountains in what we later learn
is a remote part of Alaska. The music is also darkly majestic, one of the
many interesting inversions the movie plays with, including not least the
stark and glaring daylight in which the noir themes unfold, and the casting of
Robin Williams in his first role as a tightly wound, deranged miscreant. The
shot cuts to the protagonist, legendary detective Will Dormer (Al Pacino)
– already looking exhausted – and his partner Hap (Martin Donovan) on
their way to a backwater town, Nightmute, to investigate the murder of a
teenage girl, Kay Connell (death #1). They’re met at the station by a local
rookie cop Ellie Burr (Hilary Swank) who has long idolised Dormer, and who
knows every detail about his high profile, much vaunted career. Dormer and
Hap have been shipped out of their home base in Los Angeles because a
murder case they had closed there (death #2) some years earlier is under
investigation by Internal Affairs for evidence tampering, which we are given
reason to believe Dormer at least is indeed guilty of (as Hap knows) as early
as in the opening credits, which it is fair to say echo Macbeth. Throughout
the movie we hear Dormer’s rationalisations in fragments about the evidence
tampering built around the conviction that they had put away a certainly
guilty, vicious man who posed an ongoing horrifying threat to children. But
on their first night in Nightmute, Hap reveals to Dormer that he has let
Internal Affairs know that he was ready to cut a deal and come clean about
his knowledge of the cover up of the evidence tampering. If Hap does so,
all their cases will be investigated and likely overturned: thus all of Dormer’s
life’s work is on the line, along with his ego and his reputation, not to mention
the likelihood that convictions of the vicious criminals they had captured and
had tried and convicted would be overturned.
Back to death #1: quite early on the investigators figured out (by good
old fashioned, if urban and sophisticated, detective work) who murdered the
young woman: Walter Finch, a sinister obsessive played by Robin Williams.
The cops and detectives lure him to a remote area near where they think the
murder occurred by planting some of the murdered girl’s belongings, and in a
frantic chase scene through dense mist and fog Finch (we rightly presume) fires
a shot in Dormer’s direction, a local cop beside him is hit (but not mortally
wounded), and Dormer rushes out into the fog in the direction the shot came
from, sees a shape, and returns fire, using a backup personal weapon when his
duty malfunctions, only to discover when he gets closer to the victim that he
has shot the now dying Hap (death #3). Hap is alive long enough to express
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dumb horror at Dormer’s having shot him, and though Dormer denies that
he did it intentionally, Hap dies not believing him.
When the local cops get to Dormer and Hap they also assume that Finch
shot Hap, and Dormer says nothing to set them straight (before they got
there, we had seen Dormer struggling mightily to figure out what to do). Even
though we viewers had seen, that is, been shown, what Dormer sees when he
shot, namely, a shape in the fog with no visible identifying features, Dormer
realises that because the evidence for evidence tampering in Los Angeles is
high, and especially because Internal Affairs knows that Hap was about to
implicate Dormer by confessing to the cover up of evidence tampering, this
shooting will look very bad indeed.
Later that night we see Dormer gruesomely (by shooting an animal car-
cass), again tampering with evidence by replacing the bullet currently in
evidence (from his personal weapon) with the newly shot one (that Finch
might have fired), so the bullets will confirm the story that Finch was Hap’s
shooter.
While the most urgent pursuit on the ground is still to capture Finch,
as Dormer closes in on that goal, his other goals of figuring out whether the
tampering was justified, and, especially, in what ways he was responsible for
Hap’s death, both increase in intensity and recede further from his grasp.
The more he introspects the more elusive his own motives become. Finch has
figured this out; he also knows what a toll the endless days – and glaringly
white nights – have taken on Dormer, and he starts to call him in his hotel
room in the middle of the night to have creepily companionable talks. While
we are in a position to judge Finch as an insane killer, and Dormer as merely
disturbed, Finch’s conviction that they are in some ways relevantly alike
stirs up an ember of fear and doubt in Dormer, fed in part by his insomnia
(which we have reason to believe from the opening shot predates the time in
Nightmute), and in part by the cumulative weight of guilt over Hap’s death
and the circumstances leading up to it. Finch’s insistence on their moral
equivalence has confounded him about almost everything, including his own
culpability in the Los Angeles case, and in Hap’s death.
In the meantime Ellie has figured out that Finch could not have shot
Hap, and that Dormer must have. But she trusts his judgment and experi-
ence enough to assume that it was an accident by inference to the best, and
in this case correct, explanation of why he covered it up. From the moment
Dormer shoots Hap on – we are at around 26 minutes into the two hour film
– the police procedural questions about what anyone knows are overtaken
by an investigation into the sub-theme of what kind of cop Dormer really is,
whether he has been rationalising the evidence tampering all along, whether
there is a difference between his justifications and Finch’s, and, most impor-
tantly, whether there is any hope for knowledge of his own motives that will
distinguish them from Finch’s. (And certainly also the question whether the
ends do justify the means, a crude consequentialism about which the movie
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takes an increasingly dim view, showing Dormer’s own rationalisations to
steadily decline in plausibility even to himself.)
The movie has not only bombarded us with an inventory of the many
threats to achieving knowledge even when we are clever, conscientious, highly
trained and experienced, and the stakes could not be higher, but it also treats
us to a startling discovery about the inaccessibility of some things intuitive
common sense might suggest we, of all people, should know: our own motives.
Because Finch knows that Dormer shot Hap he is also now in a position to
end Dormer’s career by exposing him, the perfect tool to blackmail Dormer
into framing Kay Connell’s high school boyfriend for her murder by plant-
ing the gun in his house. Dormer instead tries to plant the gun in Finch’s
apartment, but Finch is one step ahead of him: he retrieves the hidden gun,
and carries out the original framing plan himself. With the murderer ap-
parently caught, and Dormer unwilling to sacrifice his career to apprehend
Finch, Dormer is free to get out of Nightmute. But no amount of rational-
isation can justify that tradeoff, and when on his way out of town Dormer
gets the news that Ellie is on her way to collect some of the dead girl’s letters
at Finch’s lakeside property he changes course literally and radically to go to
try to prevent Ellie from meeting the same end.
During the gripping battle of wits and shots (and angles) that ensues,
Ellie finally asks Dormer if he meant to shoot Hap. He answers that he just
doesn’t know any more, a stunning revelation.
Dormer and Finch ultimately end up shooting each other at the same
time, Finch dies, and Dormer staggers out into the light on the dock where
Ellie now has the chance to confront him with the bullet that reveals the
truth about who shot Hap, and makes him a death bed offer to get rid of it.
His answer: ‘Don’t lose your way.’
This movie provides us with a case in point of what a movie can do to
advance anyone’s understanding of several philosophical questions and issues.
First, it shows viewers arcs of moral development, both advances and declines
of integrity, in several of the characters. Second, it plausibly shows viewers
that luck can play a morally significant role in our decision making. Third, it
indicts means/ends reasoning by showing its inevitable insidious corrupting
effects. And finally, it shows us how fragile we agents are in our pursuit of
knowledge: everything from acts of nature interfering with our vision (and
other senses), to the threat of the distortions from insomnia, to our own
complicated motives becoming hard to distinguish from those of an insane,
evil killer. It shows how the best possible evidence we have available about
what is the case about ourselves and the world, and about what we believe
is the case, remains equivocal.
You will notice that in my exposition of the movie never once did I mention
‘Descartes’, or even try to sneak up on it by uttering ‘demons, dreamers, or
madmen’, all of which play a robust role in the tale. Nor did I link the
interpretation to a particular welter of other well-known philosophical views.
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I could have. But the point is that I did not have to. They are clear enough
in the work to viewers who have never even heard of Descartes. Besides, the
movie does more than pursue a Cartesian project with feverish intensity. It
takes a different tack by upending Descartes’ one sure conclusion about the
cogito by showing us in many entirely plausible ways how even our own agency
can be opaque to us. It also suggests that close third parties (Hap and Ellie)
might know us better than we know ourselves. At a larger thematic level the
movie is deliberately ambiguous about whether Dormer has gone so far over
to the dark side of his rationalisations that he would collude with Finch, and
sacrifice the murder investigation for the sake of preserving his career. This
ambiguity is consistent with what we see of how Dormer comes up with the
scheme of planting and concealing evidence: it is not exactly premeditated,
but rather fluid and opportunistic, and relies on luck too, a series of reactions
to circumstances: we are invited to believe Dormer’s manipulation of Finch
would have evolved the same way. This series of off-the-cuff reactions eroding
moral and professional principles helps dramatise how one’s choices can seem
to be responses to a maze created by forces outside the self rather than choices
that originate wholly in the self.
So what does my reading of Insomnia tell us about IO? I hope it reveals
that there are a variety of ways to establish whether a movie can do phi-
losophy. It provides a way to go through the horns of the IO objection or
Wartenberg’s IO-ish response to it by asking instead whether a movie can
advance reasonably reflective viewers’ understanding of philosophical issues:
don’t think but look.9 And I trust my analysis has shown that Insomnia takes
up with subtlety and sophistication several genuine philosophical questions,
and in due course provides a variety of answers to them. Someone might still
ask why the things I have pointed out about the movie are to be understood
as philosophical. In the spirit of G.E. Moore, I would reply that at this stage
of the exchange the critic has the burden of proof backwards and is the one
who needs to provide an argument for thinking they are not. On my view
philosophy can be brought to us to be considered and practiced in our living
rooms, in theaters, in the popular press and social media, and so on, all of
which make up something like the modern equivalent to the agora.
We philosophical sophisticates could say that, even so, the philosophical
work Insomnia does is well trod ground. I do not think so, not in this inter-
esting, engaging combination, but even if it were, so what? There is freshness
and originality here in the expression of the ideas, and while part of their
force comes from the particularity of the characters and their circumstances,
viewers can nonetheless leave the movie thinking more generally about the in-
tertwining of metaphysical, ethical, and epistemological matters, even if they
don’t know a single one of those terms.
katheryndoran@gmail.com
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NOTES
1Wartenberg 2007.
2Wartenberg 2007, 26.
3Wartenberg 2007, 5.
4Wartenberg 2007, 84-85.
5Wartenberg 2007, 26.
6Wartenberg 2007, 9.
7Nunan 2017. I once thought that
Wartenbergian analyses could be sufficient
to establish that a movie was philosophi-
cal; I am now less sure that they are. Their
very aggressive ‘translation’ of the cine-
matic medium into an essentially different
genre, text based and rational, leaves out
too much of what is distinctively interest-
ing about what movies do.
8Elgin 1999, 146-169. Chapter V, ‘The
Heart Has its Reasons’.
9Wittgenstein 2009.
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